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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Insurance Manual was a 
"Governing Instrument" under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804, 
In general terms under the Utah Probate Code, a "governing instrument" is a 
deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with POD 
designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-
sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or 
exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, 
appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(19). 
Under § 75-2-804, the definition of "governing instrument" is further refined to 
include only those documents "executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or 
annulment of his marriage to his former spouse." Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804(l)(d). 
Mary Beth has acknowledged that the governing instruments in this case are the 
Policy and the Designation of Beneficiary executed by Dan Malloy in 1989. The Manual 
is not a "governing instrument" under §§ 75-1-201 or 75-2-804, regardless of any 
reference to it on the beneficiary designation form. There is nothing to suggest that the 
Manual is anything other than an interpretation of the Policy. To make it so would be to 
allow administrative interpretation of a statutory scheme to trump a well-defined state 
law. Moreover, it cannot be said the Dan Malloy "executed" the Manual at any point. 
The Manual is not the policy and is not a document "executed" by Dan Malloy and is 
l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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therefore not a governing instrument. The district court erred determining that the Manual 
was a "governing instrument" under § 75-2-804. 
II. The Private Right of Action Permitted in § 75-2-804 is Not Preempted 
by FEGLIA and Permits Appellants to Recover Dan Malloy's Insurance Policy 
Proceeds from Mary Beth. 
Although the trial court did not expressly decide the issue of a private right of 
action under § 75-2-804, it illuminates the reason for remanding this case to the trial 
court. A presumption exists against federal preemption of certain areas of state law, 
including "[t]he whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and 
child." Rose v. Rose, 481 US. 619, 625 (1987), quoting In re Burrus, 136 US. 586, 593-
594 (1890). State law may be preempted by federal law where there is "clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress" to effect preemption, a purpose that can be demonstrated 
by the express language of the federal enactment or its structure and purpose, or by a 
direct conflict between the terms of the federal and state enactments, or by a showing that 
federal law occupies the field so completely as to justify the inference that state 
legislation addressing that subject is precluded. Sedarous v. Sedarous, 666 A.2d 1362, 
1366 (N.J. App. Div. 1995), citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US. 504, 515-16 
(1992). The presence of express preemption language, such as that contained in FEGLIA, 
requires a determination of exactly what is preempted. Anything beyond the preemptive 
reach of the statute is, of course, not preempted. Id. 
The Sedarous court's decision is representative of the reasoning adopted by many 
courts that once FEGLI has executed its function to distribute insurance proceeds, legal 
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avenues at the state law level for recovering those proceeds from the named beneficiary, 
such as through a constructive trust or the private right of action created by §75-2-
804(7)(a), are not preempted. See generally McCordv. Spradling, 830 So.2d 1188, 1202 
(Miss. 2002)(finding persuasive state court holdings that the "distinction between 
beneficiary status and ultimate equitable entitlement obviates any issue of federal 
preemption of state-court action"); see also Fagan v. Chaisson, 179 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2005). There is no need to afford FEGLIA broader preemption than necessary. 
In fact, such an approach serves "to protect and promote the essential purpose and policy 
of FEGLIA itself." Sedarous, 666 A.2d at 1366. 
Mary Beth argues that § 75-2-804 is preempted by FEGLIA because the FEGLI 
designation of beneficiary preempts that statute. However, § 75-2-804(7)(a) provides for 
recovery of benefits paid wrongfully without affecting FEGLIA's ability to administrate 
its insurance plans. This occurs in the context of FEGLIA preempting the automatic 
revocation upon divorce provision of § 75-2-804. In the event that such preemption 
occurs, then the individual who would have been entitled to the benefit of the FEGLI 
policy in the absence of preemption has a private right of action to recover the benefit 
paid to the designated beneficiary. Numerous courts have found that FEGLIA preemption 
extends only to the point that FEGLI performs its role by distributing proceeds of its 
policies and thus ceases to operate relative to the designated beneficiaries. Any 
subsequent decision on appeal of the decision in In re Estate of Paul J. Sauers, III, 
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Deceased, 971 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Sup. 2009), previously cited by Appellants does not 
invalidate Appellants' argument that § 75-2-804(7)(a) is not preempted here.1 
As the Sedarous court reasoned, FEGLLVs purpose is "to provide government 
workers, who are in any event able to purchase life insurance in the private market, with 
the same job benefits available to employees in the private sector." Sedarous, 666 A.2d at 
1367. In addition, it was Congress' intention to streamline the process of payment of 
benefits under FEGLI policies that primarily drives the designation provisions. O 'Neal v. 
Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988). The Sedarous court explained that 
avoiding preemption serves these purposes "by keeping the OPM [Office of Personnel 
Management] and the insurance company out of legal entanglements." Sedarous, 666 
A.2d at 1367. The insurance carrier and the government are likewise free from 
interpreting state statutes, divorce decrees, property settlement agreements or wills. Id. 
The Sedarous court and similar decisions have found that there is no direct conflict 
between the statutes nor has Congress occupied the field of life insurance so completely 
that preemption would arise. Id.
 ?f 
There is nothing in the Policy or the Designation of Beneficiary that qualifies as 
"express terms" that would render § 75-2-804 ineffective, and in fact § 75-2-804 
supplements FEGLI A in that it provides a means for proper distribution of proceeds after 
1
 Appellants note that the appellate decision reversing Sauers was rendered on November 
23, 2011, only two weeks prior to submission of Appellants' brief and that Appellants 
were unaware of the decision at the time of filing their opening brief. 
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FEGLI has accomplished its purpose of administrative efficiency and speed in paying 
benefits. The result is that the Court of Appeals should vacate the judgment against 
Rhonda denying her claims and remand to the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's 
decision and remand to the District Court for further evaluation of the issue of the private 
right of action conferred by § 75-2-804. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of May, 2012. 
PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS 
JasonHc. Hunter / y 
J o ^ v . Mayer f / 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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